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Viewing the Chinese economy as a speeding car, there are three types of development 
that could  crash the car: (1) a hardware failure, which is the breakdown of an economic 
mechanism (analogous to the collapse of the chassis of the car), e.g. a banking crisis; (2) a 
software failure, which is a flaw in governance that creates social disorders (analogous to a fight 
among the people inside the car), e.g. the state not being able to meet the rising social 
expectations about its performance because many of the key regulatory institutions are absent 
or ineffective; and (3) a power supply failure, which is the loss of economic viability (analogous 
to the car running out of gas or having its ignition key pulled out) e.g. an environmental collapse 
or an export collapse. 
  
The fact that China has recently declared that its most important task is to build a 
Harmonious Society (described as a democratic society under the rule of law and living in 
harmony with nature) suggests that improvements in governance and protection of the 
environment are among the most serious challenges to achieving sustainable development.  The 
greatest inadequacy of the Harmonious Society vision is the absence of an objective to build a 
harmonious world because a harmonious society cannot endure in China unless there is also a 
harmonious world, and vice-versa.  The large amount of structural adjustments in the developed 
countries generated by rapid globalization and technological innovations has made the 
international atmosphere ripe for trade protectionism; and environmental degradation has made 
conflict over the global environmental commons more likely. China's quest for a harmonious 
society requires it to help provide global public goods, particularly the strengthening of the 
multilateral free trade system, and the protection of the global environmental commons.   
Specifically, China should work actively for the success of the Doha Round and for an 
international research consortium to develop clean coal technology. 




1. What Could Derail China’s High Growth? 
 
 
China's watchers in the main are optimistic about continued high growth of the Chinese 
economy.  This optimism is in line with the more generalized optimism about the future of the 
world because of accelerating globalization and technological innovation.
1  For example, Smart 
Money on Wall Street is predicting robust growth in Brazil, India and Russia as well.
2   The 
combined GDP of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) which amounted to only 15 percent of 
the GDP of the G-7 in 2005 ($27.3 trillion) is expected to grow rapidly to become equal to the 
GDP of the G-7 in 2040 ($52.3 trillion); see Table 1.  In this redistribution of global economic 
power, economic leadership would pass from the United States to China, whose GDP would 
equal the US GDP in 2040 and exceed it by 40.6 percent in 2050.  
The road to prosperity for China might not be a smooth one, however, despite the fact 
that China's economy has been like a speeding car for almost thirty years.
3  The reality is that 
the past is not necessarily a good predictor of the future; otherwise, there would not be turning 
points in history like the fast disintegration of the Soviet Union and the rapid, radical 
transformation of Japan upon the Meiji restoration.  A good clue as to what the most likely 
precipitating factors are is found in the discussions of the 6th Plenum of the 16th Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) that concluded on October 11, 2006.  The 
6th Plenum passed  a resolution to commit the CPC to establish a Harmonious Society by 2020.  
The obvious implication from this commitment is that the present major social, economic and 
political trends within China might not lead to a harmonious society or, at least, not lead to a 
harmonious society fast enough. 
The harmonious socialist society proposed by the 6th Plenum would encompass: 
•  a democratic society under the rule of law; 
•  a society based on equality and justice; 
•  an honest and caring society;  
•  a stable, vigorous and orderly society; and 
•  a society in which humans live in harmony with nature. 
 
                                                 
1  One of the more elegant expression of this sentiment would be Friedman (2005). 
2 For example, Jim O’Neill, Dominic Wilson, Roopa Purushothaman and Anna Stupnytska (2005) of Goldman Sachs 
3 For a review of the debate on how to interpret China's high growth in the 1978-2000 period and why China, unlike 
the economies of the former Soviet bloc, did not experience a recession when it made the switch from a centrally-




The important inference from the explicit affirmation of the above five objectives is that China 
has not been making satisfactory progress toward them.  This new emphasis in 2006 on 
democratic practice, the rule of law, and income equality represents a turning point because, 
ever since the famous December 1978 Plenum put China on the road to capitalism, every 
Plenum had ended with the declaration that the foremost work of the Party for the coming year 
was economic construction because China was still in the primary stage of socialism.
4 
What is the origin of the CPC’s decision to change its primary focus from "economic 
construction" to "social harmony"?  And why include a target date of 2020?  I believe that the 
policy change has come about because the younger and better educated CPC leadership led by 
Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao recognises that: 
1.  material conditions and public expectations in China have changed so much since 1978 
that without accelerated institutional reforms and new major policy initiatives on a broad 
front, economic construction that continues using the 1978-2005 policy framework, which 
had produced an average annual GDP growth rate of almost 10 percent, is 
unsustainable; and 
2.  unless their new policies could produce significant improvements in social harmony by 
2020, social instability would reduce China's economic growth, hence, making the 
leadership of CPC in Chinese politics unsustainable. 
To return to the analogy of China's economy being like a speeding car, the Hu-Wen 
leadershp saw several high-probability failures that could cause the car to crash in the near 
future.  Analytically, three classes of failures could occur (1) hardware failure, (2) software failure, 
and (3) power supply failure. 
A hardware failure refers to the breakdown of an economic mechanism, a development that 
is analogous to the collapse of the chassis of the car.  Probable hardware failures are (1) a 
banking crisis that causes a credit crunch that, in turn, dislocates production economy-wide, and 
(2) a budget crisis that necessitates reductions in important infrastructure and social expenditure 
(and also possibly generates high inflation, and balance of payments difficulties as well). 
A software failure refers to a flaw in governance that creates frequent widespread social 
disorders that disrupt production economy-wide and discourage private investment.  This 
situation is similar to a car crash that resulted from a fight among the people inside the speeding 
car.  Software failures could come from (1) the present high-growth strategy creating so much 
                                                 
4 For example, the 2005 Plenum reiterated the Dengist mantra that "economic development is the top priority for the 
CPC, all efforts should be focused on economic development."; see "CPC Plenary session calls for developing the 
economy based on scientific concept," People's Daily Online, October 12, 2005; 




inequality, and corruption that, in turn, generates severe social unrest which dislocates economic 
activities; and (2) the state not being responsive enough to rising social expectations, hence 
causing social disorder. 
A power supply failure refers to the economy being unable to move forward because it hits 
either a natural limit or an externally-imposed limit, a situation that is akin to the car running out 
of gas or having its engine switched off because an outsider reached in and pulled out the 
ignition key.  Examples of power supply failures are (1) an environmental collapse, e.g. climate 
change, a type of disaster that has happened quite often in history, e.g.  Diamond (2005); and 
(2) a collapse in China's exports because of a trade war 
My perception is that the Chinese leadership is moderately confident that it could prevent 
most hardware failures and respond appropriately to ones that occur.  The leadership is less 
confident however about its ability to prevent, and react optimally to, software failures and power 
supply failures.  Even more, the leadership knows that the negative trends since the mid-1990s 
of widening income disparity, worsening corruption, rising social expectations, growing trade 
imbalances, and deteriorating natural environment have increased the probability of software 
failures and power supply failures.  This increased attention by the Hu-Wen leadership on 
possible software failures and power supply failures is the origin of China's quest for a 
harmonious society.   
This paper will focus on three events that could make China's high growth unsustainable (1) 
social disorder caused by outmoded governance; (2) trade protectionism generated by the fast 
integration of China into the international economy; and (3) environmental collapse (especially 
water shortage) as a result of inept environmental management.  It must be emphasized that 
these three events have high probabilities of happening only as long as the present socio-
economic policy regime continues.  With the root-and-branch reform of China's society as 
specified in the Harmonious Society program, and with drastic reform of the economic system 





                                                 
5 This fundamental change in the overall policy regime will not only reduce poverty, income inequality, and financial 





2. The Need for Improved Governance to Sustain Economic 
Growth 
 
The well functioning of a market economy requires a wide array of regulatory institutions 
that range from straightforward law-and-order administration to complicated legal adjudication 
that would, for example, have the prerequisite scientific understanding to determine whether a 
patent case involves real technological innovation or not.  China's strategy of incremental reform 
combined with the fact that institution building is a time-consuming process meant that many of 
its regulatory institutions are either absent or ineffective.  The results have been governance 
failures on many fronts, of which the most well-known recent governance failures are the 
violations against the welfare of consumers and workers. 
There have been significant regulatory failures in keeping China's food supply and 
pharmaceutical products safe.  The misuse of chemicals to lower production costs has resulted 
in the addition of poisonous substitutes into toothpaste
6, cough medicine
7, and animal feed
8; the 
application of lead paint to children toys
9 ; and the over-employment of antifungals and 
antibacterials in fish farming
10.  Most of these above abuses received enormous attention 
because these items were exported to other countries and their harmful effects were reported 
widely in the international press.
11  Clearly, the Chinese consumers have been suffering much 
more from such types of malfeasance, the scope of which has not been realised because of the 
considerable press censorship in China.
12 
Dereliction in duty by government officials is the fundamental reason for such 
governance failures.  The most well-known recent case was the conviction of Zheng Xiaoyu, the 
former director of China's food and drug safety agency, for accepting bribes to approve 
                                                 
6  "China Investigates Contaminated Toothpaste," The New York Times, May 22, 2007; and "China Prohibits 
Poisonous Industrial Solvent in Toothpaste," The New York Times, July 12, 2007.  
7 "From China to Panama, a Trail of Poisoned Medicine," The New York Times, May 6, 2007 
8 "Filler in Animal Feed Is Open Secret in China," The New York Times, April 20, 2007; and "Another Chemical 
Emerges in Pet Food Case," The New York Times, May 9, 2007. 
9 "As More Toys Are Recalled, the Trail Ends in China," The New York Times, June 19, 2007; "Train Wreck," The New 
York Times, June 19, 2007; and "Fisher-Price recalls 1.5m China-made toys," Financial Times, August 2 2007.  The 
first article also reported the recall of a ghoulish fake eyeball that was filled with kerosene, and of an infant wrist rattle 
that a choking hazard. 
10  "F.D.A. Curbs Sale of 5 Seafoods Farmed in China," The New York Times, June 29, 2007; and "A Slippery, 
Writhing Trade Dispute," The New York Times, July 3, 2007. 
11 For example, radial tires were manufactured without the gum strips that prevented the tires from separating; see 
"Chinese Tires Are Ordered Recalled," ," The New York Times, June 26, 2007. 




production licenses for pharmaceutical companies and food companies.  Such dereliction in 
official oversight has resulted in: 
“tens of thousands of people ..[being] sickened or killed every year as a result of 
rampant counterfeiting of drugs, and tainted and substandard food and drugs.  
For instance, last year 11 people died in China with an injection tainted by a 
poisonous chemical.  Six people died and 80 others fell ill after taking an antibiotic 
that had been produced ... with a substandard disinfectant.  Small drug makers in 
China have long been accused of manufacturing phony or substandard drugs and 
marketing them to the nation's hospitals and pharmaceutical companies.  And 
mass poisonings involved tainted food products are common.”
13 
There have also been significant regulatory failures in the treatment of labor, especially in 
the areas of occupational safety and wage payments.  One of the most recent horrifying 
accounts involved forced labor of kidnapped children in the brick kilns of Shanxi and Henan 
provinces.
14  The official China Daily reported that "as many as 1,000 children may have been 
sold into slave labor in central China."
15  This deplorable affair was exposed partly "because of 
an open letter posted online by a group of 400 fathers appealing for help in tracking missing 
sons they believed were sold to kiln boss."
16  A parent visiting the brick kilns in her quest to find 
her son found that the local police were not only unwilling to help but also demanded bribes 
instead.
17  In one case, the brick kiln was owned by the son of the village Party secretary.
18 
Perhaps, the two most dismaying revelations from the news reports on the brick kiln 
slavery are that this sad state of affairs had been going on for a decade
19; and the "forced labor 
and sexual exploitation have increased as the trend in human trafficking in China has taken a 
turn for the worst."
 20  Yin Jianzhong, the senior official at the Ministry of Public Security who 
identified the worsening trend in human trafficking in China, recognized a reason for the negative 
development to be "the loopholes in the legal and labor systems ... [Specifically,] the "Criminal 
Law on human trafficking protects women and children only and leaves out grown-up and teen 
                                                 
13 "Ex-Chief of China Food and Drug Unit Sentenced to Death for Graft," The New York Times, May 30, 2007; and 
"For 2 Children, Ban of a Drug Came Too Late," The New York Times, July 13, 2007.  
14 "China to investigate into 'slave labor' incident," China Daily, June 16, 2007.  The New York Times ("China Slave 
Scandal Brings Resignation Calls," June 18, 2007) reported that: "The workers endured prison-like confinement with 
fierce dogs and beatings ... Released workers were shown on television with festering wounds and emaciated 
bodies."  
15 "China brickwork slave children may number 1,000," China Daily, June 15, 2007. 
16 "5 Chinese Arrested in Enslavement Case," The New York Times, June 18, 2007. 
17 "Reports of Forced Labor Unsettle China," The New York Times, June 16, 2007. 
18 "5 Chinese Arrested in Enslavement Case," The New York Times, June 18, 2007. 
19  This point was made by the popular tabloid Southern Metropolis Daily, see "China Slave Scandal Brings 
Resignation Calls," The New York Times, June 18, 2007. 




males. It doesn't have provisions for punishing those trafficking people for forced labor or 
prostitution."
21  The fact that such legal loopholes exist supports our contention that the main 
cause behind the administrative failures in China is the "dereliction of duty by government 
officials."
22 
Inadequate institutions of governance are not the only cause of social tensions in China, 
however.  The present economic development strategy, despite its ability to generate high 
growth, also generates high social tensions because, in the last ten years, it has had great 
difficulties in reducing extreme poverty further and in improving significantly the rural-urban 
income distribution and the regional income distribution; see Woo, Li, Yue, Wu, and Xu (2004), 
and Démurger, Sachs, Woo, Bao, Chang, and Mellinger (2002).  In the first half of the 1990s, the 
$1 poverty rate (i.e. the proportion of rural population receiving a daily income of $1 or less), 
dropped rapidly from 31.3 percent in 1990 to 15.0 percent in 1996.  But in the following six years, 
the decline was only 5 percentage points, see Table 2.  The $1 poverty rate stayed in the 10-12 
percent rate in the 1998-2003 period even though the GDP growth rate averaged 8.5 percent 
annually.  It was only after the sustained large scale effort to develop western China began in 
2001 and the post-2002 rise in the GDP growth rate to 10 percent or higher that the $1 poverty 
rate dropped to 7.9 percent in 2004 and then to 7.2 percent in 2005. 
However, the progress in poverty alleviation in the last decade is considerably much less 
impressive when the poverty line is lowered.  The $0.71 poverty rate stayed unchanged from 
1998 (4.6 percent) to 2005 (4.2 percent); and the $0.50 poverty rate actually increased from 1.9 
percent in 1998 to 2.8 percent in 2005.  In short, the higher growth rate in the 2003-2005 period 
did not cause income to trickle down to the poorest 5 percent of the rural population, and hence 
caused income inequality to worsen. 
In the 1985-1987 period, China’s Gini coefficient was below 0.3.
23  According to a report 
in the official China Daily in June 2005: 
“China's income gap widened in the first quarter of the year [2005], with 10 
percent of the nation's richest people enjoying 45 percent of the country's wealth 
… China's poorest 10 percent had only 1.4 percent of the nation's wealth … No 
                                                 
21 "More forced into prostitution, labor," China Daily, July 27, 2007. 
22  This point was made by the Shanxi governor, Yu Youjun, who said: "For a long time, relevant government 
departments did little to regulate rural workshops, small coal mines and small factories, and they are basically out of 
control and are not being supervised ... The dereliction of duty by civil servants and the corruption of individuals have 
made it possible for illegal labour to exist, particularly the abductions of migrant workers, and forced labour of children 
and mentally disabled people" -- see "Fears linger over child slaves at kilns," South China Morning Post, June 23, 
2007. 
23  The Gini coefficient has a value between 0 and 1, and the higher the value, the greater the degree of income 
inequality.  Wu and Perloff (2005) put the rural and urban Gini coefficients to be 0.272 and 0.191 respectively in 1985; 




precise Gini coefficient was provided [by the state statistical agency], but state 
press reports in recent weeks said the value was more than 0.48 and 
approaching 0.5 …. Most developed European nations tend to have coefficients 
of between 0.24 and 0.36, while the United States has been above 0.4 for several 
decades ..”
24 
Table 3 presents the income inequality in China within the international context.  China’s 
Gini coefficient climbed from 40.74 percent in 1993 to 47.25 percent in 2004 and overtook the 
four Asian countries (Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia and Turkmenistan) that had higher Gini 
coefficients than China in 1993-1994.  While Nepal has the highest Gini coefficient in Asia in 
2001-2004, its value of 47.30 percent is statistically indistinguishable from China’s value of 47.25 
percent.  If we combine this with the fact that China’s income ratio of the richest 20 percent to 
the poorest 20 percent (11.37) is the highest in Asia and is significantly higher than the next 
highest income ratio (9.47 for Nepal), China is probably the most unequal country in Asia today. 
 
Parts 2, 3 and 4 of Table 3 reveal that China’s income inequality today is generally lower 
than in Latin America but generally higher than in Africa and in the non-Asian developed 
countries.  The steady increase in China’s income inequality since 1985 raises the possibility 
that China is heading toward the Latin American degree of income inequality.  
  
The reason why doing more of the same economic policies in today's China will not 
produce the same salubrious results of quick reduction in poverty and slow increase in inequality 
as in the early phases of economic reform is because the development problems have changed.  
In the first phase of economic development, the provision of more jobs (through economic 
deregulation) was enough to lower poverty significantly.  At the present, many of the people who 
are still poor require more than just job opportunities, they need an infusion of assistance (e.g. 
empowering them with human capital through education and health interventions) first in order to 
be able to take up these job opportunities.  Effective governance for equitable growth has now 
become even more challenging, and so the probability of improving social harmony has been 
diminished.  
 
Furthermore, the present mode of economic development also generates immense 
opportunities for embezzlement of state assets, seizure of farmlands for industrial development, 
                                                 




and corruption because of the absence of effective mechanisms to supervise government 
employees; see Woo (2001).  These features certainly make social harmony hard to sustain.   
 
The data on social unrest are consistent with the hypothesis of rising social disharmony.  
First, the incidence of public disorder, labeled "social incidents", has risen steadily from 8,700 in 
1993 to 32,500 in 1999 and then to 74,000 in 2004.  Second, the average number of persons in 
a mass incident has also risen greatly, from 8 in 1993 to 50 in 2004.
25  It should be noted, 
however, that these numbers might not portray accurately the degree that social unrest has 
increased because the data include disco brawls and gambling den raids as well as social 
protests; see EastSouthWestNorth (no date).  
 
Clearly, the number of mass incidents would have been lower if China had better 
governance.  There would have been more pre-emptive efforts at conflict mediation by the 
government and less abuse of power by government officials if the government's actions had 
been monitored closely by an independent mechanism, and the government had also been held 
more accountable for its performance.  It is therefore not naive to see the Harmonious Society 
program as a serious attempt at fundamental reform of China's institutions of governance, going 
well beyond the reform of economic institutions.  This assessment is substantiated by the 
identification of the first component of a harmonious society as "a democratic society under the 
rule of law."  This point was confirmed in a meeting between Premier Wen and the Brookings 
Board of Trustees in October 2006, where Premier Wen dwelt at length on how China intends to 
make greater use of democratic mechanisms (e.g. extending free elections to above the village 
level) to mediate social conflicts and to improve public administration. 
 
One main source of recent social unrest in rural China has been the conversion of farm 
land to industrial parks without adequate compensation to the farmers.  It is interesting therefore 
that the No. 1 Document issued jointly in January 2006 by the CPC Central Committee and the 
State Council pledged not only to "stabilise and regulate the transfer of land-use rights and 
                                                 
25 1993 number is from Keidel (2005, pp. 1), and 2004 number is from Pei (2005) who wrote that, in 2004, there were 
74,000 "mass incidents" involving 3.7 million people compared to 10,000 such incidents involving 730,000 people in 
1994.  Possibly, because of the widespread attention in the Western media on the marked rise in mass incidents, the 
post-2004 definition of mass incidents appeared to have been changed, making post-2004 data not comparable with 
the 1994-2004 data; see discussion in EastSouthWestNorth (no date).  Tanner (2004 and 2005) are excellent 




accelerate land acquisition reforms" but also to "expand channels to express public opinions in 
the countryside and improve the mechanism to resolve social conflicts."
26  
 
The desire by the Hu-Wen leadership to improve the institutions of governance is also 
borne out by the following report from the South China Morning Post about what Premier Wen 
said when he met a group of Chinese citizens in Japan in April 2007:
 27 
“During 30 minutes of impromptu remarks, he said the key to pursuing social 
justice, the mainland's most important task, was to ‘let people be masters of their 
houses and make every cadre understand that power is invested in them by the 
people’.  
……. Although he did not deviate from the official line and spoke informally on 
both occasions, Mr Wen is known for being careful about what he says, whether 
in prepared remarks or speaking off the cuff. The fact that he highlighted, in the 
presence of Hong Kong and overseas journalists, the need for political reform is 
uncharacteristic and interesting, particularly in the context of the leadership 
reshuffle looming at the Communist Party's 17th congress later this year.  
There have been signs that the leadership under President Hu Jintao is under 
increasing pressure to undertake drastic political reforms to consolidate the 
party's grip on power and stamp out widespread corruption.” 
 
While there are reasonable grounds for an analyst to doubt  either the sincerity of 
Premier Wen's words or his ability to act on them
28, the analyst cannot doubt that Premier Wen 
is at least aware that democracy is one way to solve many of China's problems of governance.  
More importantly, the analyst cannot doubt that Premier Wen, like many of his countrymen, must 
                                                 
26 "New pledge to give farmers a louder voice," South China Morning Post, Tuesday, January 30, 2007.  The No. 1 
Document designation is designed to show that this is the most important task in the new year. 
27 “Impromptu remarks reveal the party's pressure for reforms,” South China Morning Post, Monday, April 16, 2007. 
28 The following quote from The New York Times (April 20, 1997) report "In China, Talk of Democracy Is Simply That" 
makes a plausible case against optimism about democratization of Chinese political life: 
Like the spring showers that give the parched landscape a veneer of green .. Communist Party journals 
and the state-run news media have published a stream of commentaries by retired officials and academics 
on “political system reform” and the need for “socialist democracy,” including a bold-sounding call for China 
to mimic Switzerland’s worker-friendly democratic governing style ... [The above developments might well 
reflect Hu Jintao's attempt] to rally support among younger party members and intellectuals ahead of an 
important party congress in the fall ... In an internal party document issued last year, Mr. Hu sharply 
criticized the Communist government of Vietnam for moving too rashly toward so-called inner-party 
democracy. He argued that the Chinese party had to maintain tight discipline to prevent the promotion of a 
figure like the former Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev, whom Chinese Communists consider a traitor to 
socialism, party officials who read Mr. Hu’s comments on the subject said.  The essays in party journals do 
not endorse multiparty democracy. Most of the authors argue that democracy can be functionally 




be well acquainted with the history of democratic development in Eastern Europe and in East 
Asia, particularly in Taiwan and Hong Kong.   
 
To understand the reasons behind  Hu-Wen's switch to democracy as the new important 
instrument to introduce external supervision and accountability into governance, it is worth 
quoting at length from two recent insightful analyses on social unrest in China.   
 
In Albert Keidel's (2006) assessment: 
“Large-scale public disturbances have been on the rise in China for more than a 
decade.  Media reports describe violence, injuries, and even deaths .... Issues 
include labor grievances, taxation, land confiscation, and pollution.  Corruption 
worsens common injustices and further inflames citizen anger ....  
 ... It is important to emphasize that China's social unrest is not made up of street 
demonstrations demanding a new government or western-style democracy ... 
China's social unrest should be understood as the unavoidable side effects -- 
worsened by local corruption -- of successful market reforms and expanded 
economic and social choice ... Managing this unrest humanely requires 
accelerated reform of legal and social institutions with special attention to 
corruption” 
 
Murray Scot Tanner (2004) reports from his examination of documents prepared by China's 
police that: 
“Most available police analyses now blame unrest primarily on approximately the 
same list of social, economic, and political forces..., implicitly relegating enemy 
instigation [i.e. conspiracy theories] to the role of a secondary catalyst ... In terms 
of internal security strategy, this characterization typically, though not always, 
reduces reliance on coercion ...  
[Many] police see a new social logic taking hold, with disgruntled citizens 
increasingly convinced that peaceful protests is significantly less dangerous and 
not only effective but often unavoidable as a means to win concessions.  Police 
sources now routinely quote a popular expression: 'Making a great disturbance 
produces a great solution.  Small disturbances produce small solutions.  Without 




 ... Socioeconomic change may generate these underlying demands and clashes 
of social interest, but it is usually government failures that cause these 
contradictions to turn antagonistic and dangerous." 
 
Clearly, the large economic dislocations caused by the reform of the planned economy, 
and the institutional failures in governance
29 are important factors behind the higher frequency of 
large social disturbances.  However, like Tanner, I am of the opinion that there is a third 
important factor behind the increasing readiness to resort to civil disorder,  which is that the 
richer and more knowledgeable Chinese population now has higher expectations about the 
performance of the government.
30  The implication of the third factor is that "Beijing may be 
kidding itself if it believes economic growth alone will bring unrest under control."
31  
 
The CPC is too astute to kid itself.  In its search for new mechanisms to improve its 
performance on governance, it naturally had to consider democratic institutions as an option 
because democracy is the well-tested means of governance in all of the developed world.  The 
two basic considerations for the CPC in deciding upon whether democracy should become the 
new centerpiece in its governance structure are: 
1.  whether democracy, the rule of law, and a stable income distribution comprise an 
indivisible combination that is necessary to ensure the social stability that will keep the 
economy on the high growth path to catch up with the United States (a vision which acts 
as the bedrock of CPC's legitimacy to rule)? 
2.  whether the CPC will be skilful and lucky enough to lead the democratic transition and 
emerge afterward as the most important political force? 
 
By proposing the Harmonious Society program, the Hu-Wen leadership has replied 
affirmatively to both questions.  Objectively, this attempt by the CPC to reinvent itself is a difficult 
and risky undertaking.  A functioning democracy requires not just free elections but also a free 
press that is responsible and a competent judiciary that is independent.  So, how would the rank 
and file of CPC (who are used to exercising unchallenged power for 50 years) react to these 
institutional changes which produce a power-sharing arrangement that is alien and chaotic?   
                                                 
29 To get a sense of how abusive the local leaders could be, the reader should consult Chen and Wu (2006) for 
documentation on 5 incidents in the 1990s in Anhui province that suggest that "[many] of China's underclass live 
under an unchanged feudal system." 
30 Tanner (2004) pointed out that the "data demonstrate that unrest began rising rapidly no later than 1993-1995 when 
the rate of economic growth exceeded 10 percent.  Protests also show a ratchet effect, remaining quite high (and 




Furthermore, a plan of gradual democratization might be initially lauded and endorsed by most 
segments of society but subsequent changes in social expectations about governmental 
responsiveness and personal freedom could easily outpace the actual developments as 
implemented according to the plan.
32   So, would the CPC then be sufficiently pragmatic to 
accelerate the plan to avoid being run over by events?
33   
 
One possible answer to both these questions is that the CPC would rise to the demands of 
the occasions and transform itself into a social democratic party.  An alternative answer based 
on the experiences from the Soviet bloc is that CPC would split and social instability would follow.  
While any answer to the two previous questions is necessarily speculative, what is much more 
definitive is the genesis of the program to achieve a harmonious society by 2020.  The fact that 
the Hu-Wen leadership, which is well-known for its political caution, has embarked on this 
technically difficult and politically risky project suggests that it has concluded that new far-
reaching reforms are less dangerous than partial reforms, and that, given the deep 
entrenchment of the disharmonious elements, time might not be on its side.
34   
 
 
3. The Need for a Harmonious World to Sustain Economic Growth 
 
China's current account in the balance of payments has been in surplus since 1994 and 
it has shown a clear upward trend, reaching $184 billion in 2006 or 9 percent of GDP.  China's 
emergence as a major trading nation has been accompanied by increasing conflicts with the 
European Union (EU) and the United States (US) about China's trading practices and its 
exchange rate policy.  On June 12, 2007, Peter Mandelson, the trade commissioner for the 
European Union described China's trade policy as "illogical", "indefensible" and "unacceptable" 
and accused of doing nothing to rein in rampant counterfeiting.
35  On June 14, 2007, a bill was 
                                                                                                                                                              
31 Tanner (2004). 
32 For example, in the same meeting with the Trustees of Brookings Institution in October 2006, Premier Wen outlined 
a step-by-step extension of free election from the village level to the provincial level.  While such a plan, if proposed, 
would most likely receive wide societal approval in 2006, it is possible that Chinese society in 2020 might have raised 
its expectations to that free election should also be held at the national level.  
33 If such escalations in social expectations are natural, then it is likely that regardless of whether or not the CPC 
defines "democracy" the same way as the U.S. constitution (or the Taiwanese constitution), the form of the democracy 
that will finally emerge in China will be closer to the latter's definition.  Perhaps, this is why the former Party Secretary 
Zhao Ziyang warned his colleagues in 1986-1987: "Democracy is not something socialism can avoid. The people's 
demand for democracy is a trend. We must meet their demand to the fullest extent." (Zhao's remarks are quoted in 
Minxin Pei, "How Far Has China to Go?" Financial Times, January 18, 2005.) 
34   This sense of urgency explains why there is an explicit deadline of 2020. 




introduced in the US Senate "to punish China if it did not change its policy of intervening in 
currency markets to keep the exchange value of the currency, the yuan, low."
36   
  
It is not uncommon to encounter allegations that the bilateral US-China trade deficit 
represented the export of unemployment from China to the United States, and that it lowered the 
wage for labor.  These allegations are not supported by the facts, however.  The steady rise in 
the US trade deficit from 1.2 percent of GDP in 1996 to 5.9 percent in 2006 was accompanied by 
a fall in the civilian unemployment rate from 5.4 percent in 1996 to 4.6 percent in 2006, and by a 
rise in the total compensation (measured in 2005 prices) received by a full-time worker from 
$48,175 in 1996 to $55,703 in 2005.
37  What is actually is fueling the rising resentment toward 
imports from China is that the U.S. worker is feeling more insecure in the 2000s than in the 
1980s because of the faster turnover in employment.  For example, the median job tenure for 
males in the 45 to 54 age group has decreased from 11.8 years in 1987 to 8.1 years in 2006.  
The two most important causes for the more frequent job turnover are the large shift in the 
international division of labor that has been set in motion by the post-1990 acceleration of 
globalization
38 and by the continued fast pace of technological innovations.
39  The resentment 
comes because the median US worker finds that there are considerable costs associated with 
the job change because of the inadequacies of the US social safety nets.
40 
 
It would be wrong, however, to think that China is blameless in the rapidly escalating 
trade tensions between China and its trading partners.  China's chronic and growing overall 
trade surplus reveals a deep-seated problem in China's economy, its dysfunctional financial 
system.  This problem is revealed by the aggregate-level accounting identity that the overall 
current account balance (of which, in China, the overall trade account is the biggest part) is 
                                                 
36 "4 in Senate Seek Penalty for China," New York Times, June 14, 2007. 
37 Compensation estimates are from Burtless (2007). 
38 The single biggest boost to economic globalization in the 1990s was perhaps the post-1990 integration of the labor 
force in the former Soviet Union, India and China (SIC) into the international division of labor.  The number of workers 
already engaged in the international division of labor in 1990 was 1,083 million, and the combined labor force of SIC 
was 1,232 million.  The international division of labor in 1990 was certainly an unnatural one because half of the 
world's workforce had been kept out of it by the SIC's autarkic policies.  By 2000, the number of workers involved in 
the international economic system in 2000 had increased to 2,672 million (with 1,363 million workers from SIC); data 
are from Freeman (2004). 
39  Feenstra and Hanson (1996) estimates the impact of these two developments on US wages.  Immigration has also 
increased the anxiety of US worker; see Ottaviano and Peri (2005). 
40 These inadequacies are discussed in Brainard  (1997) and Gary Burtless (2005).  The latter reports that within the 
G-7 in 2004, only the United Kingdom has a less generous unemployment benefits scheme than the United States.  
An unemployed person in the US received initial unemployment benefits that equaled 53 percent of previous income 
compared to 78 percent in Germany, 76 percent in Canada and France, 61 percent in Japan, 60 percent in Italy, and 
46 percent in UK.  The duration of unemployment benefits was 6 months in the US compared to 12 months in 




determined by the fiscal position of the government, and the savings-investment decisions of the 
state-controlled enterprise (SCE) sector and the private sector, which together make up the non-
government sector.
41  Specifically: 
 
CA = (T - G) + (SSCE - ISCE) + (Sprivate - Iprivate) 
where  CA = current account in the balance of payments 
CA = (X - M) + R 
X    = export of goods and non-factor services 
M   = import of goods and non-factor services 
R   = net factor earnings from abroad (i.e. export of factor services) 
T   = state revenue 
G   = state expenditure (including state investment) 
SSCE   = saving of the SCEs 
ISCE    = investment of the SCEs 
Sprivate = saving of the private sector 
Iprivate  = investment of the private sector 
 
The Chinese fiscal position (T-G) has for the last decade had a small deficit, and so it is 
not the cause of the swelling current account surpluses in the 2000s.  The current account 
surplus exists because the sum of savings by SCEs and the private sector exceeds the sum of 
their investment expenditures. 
  
Why has China's financial system failed to translate the savings into investments?  Such 
an outcome was not always the case.  Before 1994, the voracious absorption of bank loans by 
SCEs to invest recklessly usually kept the current account negative and the creation of 
nonperforming loans (NPLs) high.  When the government implemented stricter controls on the 
state-owned banks (SOBs) from 1994 onward (e.g. removing top bank officials whenever their 
bank lent more than its credit quota or allowed the NPL ratio to increase too rapidly), the SOBs 
slowed down the growth of loans to SCEs.  This cutback created an excess of savings because 
the SOB-dominated financial sector did not re-channel the released savings (which were also 
increasing) to finance the investment of the private sector.  This failure in financial intermediation 
by the SOBs is quite understandable.  Firstly, the legal status of private enterprises was, until 
                                                 
41 The SCE category covers companies that are classified as state-owned enterprises, and joint-ventures and joint-




recently, lower than that of the state enterprises; and, secondly, there was no reliable way to 
assess the balance sheets of the private enterprises, which were naturally eager to escape 
taxation.  The upshot was that the residual excess savings leaked abroad in the form of the 
current account surplus.  Inadequate financial intermediation has made developing China a 
capital exporting country! 
  
This perverse current account outcome is not new.  Taiwan had exactly this problem up 
to the mid-1980s when all Taiwanese banks were state-owned and were operated according to 
the civil service regulation that the loan officer had to repay any bad loan that he had approved.  
The result was a massive failure in financial intermediation that caused Taiwan's current account 
surplus to be 21 percent of GDP in 1986.  The reason why China has not been producing the 
gargantuan current account surpluses seen in Taiwan in the mid-1980s is because of the large 
amount of SCE investments. 
  
Why is the savings rate of the non-government sector rising?  The combined savings of 
the SOE and non-SOE sector rose from 20 percent in 1978 to 30 percent in 1987, and then went 
above 45 since 2004.  In discussions on the rise of the savings rate, a common view is that the 
rise reflects the uncertainty about the future that many SOE workers feel in the face of 
widespread privatization of loss-making SOEs.  We find this explanation incomplete because it 
seems that there has also been a rise in the rural saving rate even though rural residents have 




We see two general changes that have caused both urban and rural saving rates to rise 
significantly.  The first is "increased worries about the future".  The steady decline in state 
subsidies to medical care, housing, loss-making enterprises, and education, and 
mismanagement of pension funds by the state have led people to save more to insure against 
future bad luck (e.g. sickness, job loss), buy their own lodging, build up nest eggs for retirement, 
and invest in their children. 
 
The second change is the secular improvement in the official Chinese attitude toward 
market capitalism.  Given the high rate of return to capital, this increasingly business-friendly 




for investment, i.e. greater optimism about the future has spawned investment-motivated 
saving.
43   
 
In our explanations for the existence of the current account surpluses and the growth of 
the surplus, there is a common element in both and that common element is China's financial 
system.  The fact is that savings behavior is not independent of the sophistication of the financial 
system.  An advanced financial system will have a variety of financial institutions that would 
enable pooling of risks by providing medical insurance, pension insurance, and unemployment 
insurance; and transform savings into education loans, housing loans, and other types of 
investment loans to the private sector.  Ceteris paribus, the more sophisticated a financial 
system, the lower the savings rate.  China generates the current account surplus because of 
inadequate financial intermediation, and the surplus grows over time because the dysfunctional 
financial system fails to pool risks to reduce uncertainty-induced savings and fails to provide 
loans to reduce investment-motivated saving. 
 
What is to be done in China?  The obvious short-run policy package has three 
components.  First, the steady process of yuan appreciation begun in July 2005 should be 
quickened, and be used more aggressively as an anti-inflation instrument.  Second, import 
liberalisation should be accelerated (e.g. implement seriously the commitments made in 
negotiations for WTO membership like intellectual property right protection) and expanded 
beyond WTO specifications.  The third component of the short-run policy package is to have an 
expansionary fiscal policy (e.g. rural infrastructure investments) to soak up the excess savings, 




Clearly, the optimum solution to the problem of excess saving is not for the government 
to absorb it by increasing its budget deficit but to establish an improved mechanism for 
coordinating private savings and private investments.  But, as international experiences show, 
this improvement in financial intermediation could be achieved only if, one, the private banks 
                                                                                                                                                              
42 Economist Intelligence Unit (2004, pp. 23) reported that "farmers' propensity to save seems to have increased." 
43 Liu and Woo (1994) and Woo and Liu (1995) contain formal modeling and econometric support for the investment-
motivated saving hypothesis. 
44 It is important that time limits be put on the expanded public works and SCE investments because, in the long-run, 
the increased public investments could follow an increasingly rent-seeking path that is wasteful (e.g building a second 
big bridge to a lowly-populated island to benefit a politically-connected construction company as in Japan), and the 




displace the SOBs from their dominant position, and, two, if an adequate system of prudential 
supervision is put into place.   
 
It should be noted that this establishment of a modern financial system will generate two 
other significant benefits.  First, it will enhance welfare and lower the savings rate by pooling 
risks through vehicles like medical insurance and pension insurance.  Second, the end of the 
SOBs will mean the end of the frequent recapitalization of the SOBs (because of their proclivity 
to generate NPLs), and hence the end of a constant threat to the fiscal solvency of the state, 
which I regard to be one of the high-probability hardware failures in China. 
  
The important conclusion from Section 3 is that the push for protectionism in EU and US 
would be lowered much more if both sides undertake corrective policies rather than if China 
acted alone, and if there is a wider range of policy instruments used (e.g. wage insurance 
program in US and financial market development in China) rather than just relying on exchange 
rate adjustment alone.  
4. The Need for Environmental Protection to Sustain Economic 
Growth 
 
The present mode of economic development has given China the dirtiest air in the world, 
is polluting more and more of the water resources, and, is, possibly, changing the climate pattern 
within China.  The reality is that CPC's new objective of living in harmony with nature is not a 
choice because the Maoist adage of "man conquering nature" is just as unrealistic as creating 
prosperity through central planning.  China’s fast growth in the last two decades has done 
substantial damage to the environmental.  Elizabeth Economy (2004, pp. 18-19) summarized the 
economic toll as follows: 
“China has become home to six of the ten most polluted cities in the world.
45  Acid 
rain now affects about one-third of China’s territory, including approximately one-
third of its farmland.  More than 75 percent of the water in rivers flowing through 
China’s urban areas is [unsuitable for human contact
46] … deforestation and 
                                                 
45 “300,000 people die prematurely from air pollution annually, which is twice the number for South Asia, which has a 
roughly comparable population” Economy, (2004, pp.85) 




grassland degradation continue largely unabated
47   ... The [annual] economic 
cost of environmental degradation and pollution … are the equivalent of 8-12 
percent of China’s annual gross domestic product.” 
 
Water shortage appears to pose the most immediate environmental threat to China's 
continued high growth.
48  Presently, China uses 67 to 75 percent of the 800 to 900 billion cubic 
meters of water available annually, and present trends in water consumption would project the 
usage rate in 2030 to be 78 to 100 percent.
49  The present water situation is actually already 
fairly critical because of the uneven distribution of water and the lower than normal rainfall in the 
past fifteen years.  Right now, "[about] 400 of China's 660 cities face water shortages, with 110 
of them severely short."
50 
 
The extended period of semi-drought in northern China combined with the economic and 
population growth have caused more and more water to be pumped from the aquifers, leading 
the water table to drop three to six meters a year.
51  And a study using measurements from 
satellites (the Global Positioning System) has established that the part of China north of the 36th 
parallel latitude has been "sinking at the rate of 2 mm a year."
52  Specifically, "Shanghai, Tianjin, 




The overall water situation in northern China is reflected in the fate of the Yellow River, 
“which started drying up every few years from 1972, did so for increasing periods 
of time over longer distances in the 1990s until 1997, when it dried up for almost 
the entire year over a stretch of several hundred kilometres.”
54 
 
                                                 
47 " … degradation has reduced China’s grassland by 30-50 percent since 1950; of the 400 million or so hectares of 
grassland remaining, more than 90 percent are degraded and more than 50 percent suffer moderate to severe 
degradation.”  Economy (2004, pp. 65) 
48 Air pollution is a serious problem.  Of the twenty cities in the world identified by the World Bank as having the 
dirtiest air, sixteen of them are located in China.  It is shocking that lead and mercury poisoning are more common 
than expected, see. "China's economic miracle contains mercuric threat," Financial Times, December 18, 2004; and 
"A Poison Spreads Amid China's Boom," Wall Street Journal, September 30, 2006. 
49 "Top official warns of looming water crisis," South China Morning Post, November 7, 2006. 
50 "China may be left high and dry," The Straits Times, January 3, 2004.  The shortage is reported to be most acute in 
Taiyuan in Shanxi and Tianjin (Becker, 2003). 
51 "Northern cities sinking as water table falls," South China Morning Post, August 11, 2001; and Becker (2003). 
52 "Northern China sinking... as the south rises," The Straits Times, March 18, 2002.  "Some 60 percent of the land in 
Tianjin municipality is plagued by subsistence" (Becker, 2003).  
53 "Chinese cities, including Olympic host Beijing, slowly sinking," Agence France-Presse, July 23, 2004. 




The utilization rate of Yellow River's water is 60 percent, far exceeding the internationally 
recommended utilization limit of 40 percent.  All the mentioned factors have contributed to 
lowering the "amount of Yellow River water feeding into the Bohai Sea" from an annual 49.6 




Water shortage and the increasing pollution of what water there is
56 are not the only 
serious environmental threats to the economy of northern China.  The desert is expanding 
(possibly, at an accelerating pace), and man appears to be the chief culprit.  The State Forestry 
Administration reported that 28 percent of the country's land mass was affected by 
desertification in 1999, and 37 percent was affected by soil erosion.  The report identified about 
65 percent of the desert as having been created by "over-cultivation, overgrazing, deforestation 
and poor irrigation practices."
57  The rate of desertification is 3,900 square miles a year,
58 an 
annual loss of a land area twice the size of Delaware.  One direct upshot is a great increase in 
the frequency of major sandstorms
59 that play "havoc with aviation in northern China for weeks, 
cripples high-tech manufacturing and worsens respiratory problems as far downstream as Japan, 
the Korean peninsula and even the western United States."
60  In the assessment of Chen Lai, 
Vice-Minister of water resources: "It will take nearly half a century for China to control the eroded 




While northern China has been getting drier and experiencing desertification, nature as if 
in compensation (or in mockery) has been blasting southern China with heavier rains, causing 
heavy floods which have brought considerable deaths and property damage almost every 
                                                 
55 "Top official warns of looming water crisis," South China Morning Post, November 7, 2006. 
56  Examples of serious water pollution are "Main rivers facing a 'pollution crisis' ," South China Morning Post, June 6, 
2003; "Booming cities polluting scarce water supplies," The Straits Times, September 18, 2003; "Rivers Run Black, 
and Chinese Die of Cancer," New York Times, September 12, 2004; " 'Cancer villages' pay heavy price for economic 
progress," South China Morning Post, May 8, 2006; and "Rules Ignored, Toxic Sludge Sinks Chinese Village," New 
York Times, September 4, 2006.  
57 "Quarter of land now desert -- and Man mostly to blame," South China Morning Post, January 30, 2002. 
58 This is average of the 3,800 square miles reported in "Billion of Trees Planted, and Nary a Dent in the Desert," New 
York Times, April 11, 2004, and the 4,014 square miles reported in "Quarter of land now desert -- and Man mostly to 
blame," South China Morning Post, January 30, 2002. 
59 The number of major sandstorms in China was 5 in the 1950-59 period, 8 in 1960-69, 13 in 1970-79, 14 in 1980-89, 
23 in 1990-99, 14 in 2000, 26 in 2001, 16 in 2002, and 11 in 2003 according to Yin Pumin, "Sands of Time Running 
Out: Desertification continues to swallow up 'healthy' land at an alarming rate," Beijing Review, June 16, 2005. 
60 "Billion of Trees Planted, and Nary a Dent in the Desert," New York Times, April 11, 2004 





62  The sad possibility is that the northern droughts and southern floods may 
not be independent events but a combination caused by pollution that originates in China.  I will 
have more to say about this possibility later. 
 
Clearly, without water, growth cannot endure.  And in response, the government begun 
implementation in 2002 of Mao Zedong's 1952 proposal that three canals be built to bring water 
from the south to the north: an eastern coastal canal from Jiangsu to Shandong and Tianjin, a 
central canal from Hubei to Beijing and Tianjin, and a western route from Tibet to the 
northwestern provinces, and each canal will be over a thousand miles long.
63  Construction of 
the eastern canal (which would be build upon a part of the existing Grand Canal) started in 2002, 
and the central canal in 2003.  Work on the western canal is scheduled to begin in 2010 upon 
completion of the first stage of the central canal.  
 
The scale of this water transfer project is simply unprecedented anywhere: 
"Together, the three channels would pump about 48 billion liters of water a year -- 
enough to fill New York's taps for a quarter century.  Only a tenth as much water 
flows through the next-largest water diversion project, in California."
64 
 
This massive construction project will not only be technically challenging but also 
extremely sensitive politically and fraught with environmental risks.  The central canal will have 
to tunnel through the foot of the huge dyke that contains the elevated Yellow River, and the 
western canal will have to transport water through regions susceptible to freezing.  The number 
of people displaced by the Three Gorges Dam was 1.1 million, and this water transfer scheme is 
a bigger project.  The enlargement of the Danjiangkou Dam (in Hubei) alone to enable it to be 
the source of the central canal will already displace 330,000 people.
65    Moving  people 
involuntarily is certainly potentially explosive politically.  The project could also be politically 
explosive on the international front as well.  One plan for the western canal calls for "damming 
                                                 
62  The National Development and Reform Commission (2007) reported: "The regional distribution of precipitation 
shows that the decrease in annual precipitation was significant in most of northern China, eastern part of the 
northwest, and northeastern China, averaging 20~40 mm/10a, with decrease in northern China being most severe; 
while precipitation significantly increased in southern China and southwestern China, averaging 20~60 mm/10a ... The 
frequency and intensity of extreme climate/weather events throughout China have experienced obvious changes 
during the last 50 years. Drought in northern and northeastern China, and flood in the middle and lower reaches of the 
Yangtze River and southeastern China have become more severe." 
63  "Ambitious canal network aims to meet growing needs," South China Morning Post, November 27, 2002.  
64  "China approves project to divert water to arid north," South China Morning Post, November 26, 2002. 
65  "Massive scheme aims to quench China's thirst," Financial Times, July 26, 2004.; a lower estimate of 300,000 is 




the Brahmaputra river and diverting 200 billion cubic metres of water annually to feed the ageing 
Yellow river," a scenario that is reportedly "giving sleepless nights to the Indian government ... 
[which is concerned that this 'Great Western Water Diverson Project] could have immense 
impact on lower riparian states like India and Bangladesh."
66  
 
The environmental damages caused by this project are the most serious for the central and 
western canals.  In the case of the central canal,  
“environmental experts [in Wuhan where the Hanjiang River flows into the 
Yangtze] are worried about ... [whether the annual extraction of eight billion cubic 
metres of water could affect] the river's ability to flush out the massive pollution 
flows released by the thousands of factories and industries along the tributaries ... 
The reduced flows could increase the frequency of toxic red algae blooms on the 
Yangtze near the confluence with the Hanjiang River. There have already been 
three blooms ... [by May of that year, 2003].”
67 
 
The western canal has generated a lively controversy.  Some scientists are contending 
that it "would cause more ecological damage than good"
68 because it "could cause dramatic 
climate changes ... [and] the changed flow and water temperature would lead to a rapid decline 
in fish and other aquatic species."
69 
 
Many opponents of the water transfer project have argued that water conservation could 
go a long way toward addressing this problem because currently a tremendous amount of the 
water is just wasted, e.g. only 50 percent of China's industrial water is recycled compared to 80 
percent in the industrialized countries,
70 and China consumes 3,860 cubic meters of water to 
produce $10,000 of GDP compared to the world average of 965 cubic meters.
71  The  most 
important reason for this inefficient use of water lies in the fact that "China's farmers, factories 
and householders enjoy some of the cheapest water in the world"
72 even though China's per 
capita endowment of water is a quarter of the world average.
73  
 
                                                 
66  "China's river plan worries India," Times Of India, October 23, 2006. 
67  "Massive scheme aims to quench China's thirst," South China Morning Post, May 12, 2003. 
68  "China Water Plan Sows Discord," Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2006. 
69 "Chinese water plan opens rift between science, state," American-Statesman, September 10, 2006. 
70  "China may be left high and dry," The Straits Times, January 3, 2004.   
71 "Alert sounded over looming water shortage," The Straits Times, June 10, 2004. 
72 "Water wastage will soon leave China high and dry," South China Morning Post, March 8, 2006. 




There is, however, the unhappy possibility that neither the price mechanism nor the three 
canals can solve China's water problem and make its growth sustainable unless the present 
mode of economic development is drastically amended.  There is now persuasive evidence that 
China's voluminous emission of black carbon (particles of incompletely combusted carbon) has 
contributed significantly to the shift to a climate pattern that produces northern droughts and 
southern floods of increasing intensity.
74  The biggest source of what has been called the "Asian 
brown cloud" in the popular media is burning of coal and bio-fuels in China.  If the pollution-
induced climate change analysis is valid, it means that: 
1.  China's massive reforestation program will not succeed in reducing sandstorms in the 
north because trees cannot survive if the amount of rainfall is declining over time; and  
2.  the number of south-north canals will have to be increased over time in order to meet the 
demand for water in northern China; 
until China reduces its emission of black carbon significantly (presuming no new large   
emissions from neighboring countries like Indian). 
 
The general point is that effective policy-making on the environmental front is a very 
difficult task because much of the science about the problem is not known.  For example, China 
must no longer select its water strategy and it energy strategy separately.  A systems approach 
in policymaking is necessary because the interaction among the outcomes from the different 
sectoral policies can generate serious unintended environmental damage.  If part of the shift in 
China's climate is integral to global climate change, then a sustainable development policy 
would require a complete rethinking about the location of population centers, and types of 
enhanced international cooperation on global environmental management. 
 
The uncomfortable reality for China is that unless ecological balance is restored within 
the medium-term, environmental limits could choke off further economic growth.  And the 
uncomfortable reality for the rest of the world is that the negative consequences of large-scale 
environmental damage within a geographically large country are seldom confined within that 
country’s borders.  The continued march of China’s desertification first brought more frequent 
sand storms to Beijing and then, beginning in April 2001, sent yellow dust clouds not only across 
the sea to Japan and Korea but also across the ocean to the United States.  China’s 
environmental management is a concern not only for China’s welfare but for global welfare as 
well.   
                                                 





In discussing the environmental aspects of the water transfer plan, it is important to note 
that there is now an open controversy in China involving a key government infrastructure project, 
and that this controversy is not limited to members of the technocracy.  The very public nature of 
the controversy and the involvement of more than just scientists, engineers and economists in it 
reveal how very far social attitudes have progressed.  The important point is that this change in 
social expectations will require any government in China to live in harmony with nature.   
However, any government will have great difficulties in doing so even if it wants to because a 
green growth policy involves a systems approach, and scientific understanding of many 
ecological sub-systems and the nature of their interactions is still rather incomplete,  
 
Proper management of the environment has now become critical if China is to continue 
its industrialization process.  The expurgated version of a 2007 World Bank reported that "about 
750,000 people die prematurely in China each year, mainly from air pollution in large cities"
75; 
and a 2007 OECD study has estimated that "China's air pollution will cause 20 million people a 
year to fall ill with respiratory diseases."
76  Pan Yue, the deputy head of the State Environmental 
Protection Agency, summed up the present situation in China very well when he said: 
“If we continue on this path of traditional industrial civilization, there is no chance 
that we will have sustainable development.  China's population, resources, 
environment have already reached the limits of their capacity to cope.   




The bad news is that there is no sign of significant progress in China's efforts to reduce pollution.  
China failed to meet its 2006 target for modest improved energy efficiency
78 ; and the 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency has claimed that China became "the world's top 
producer of carbon dioxide" in 2006.
79  The worrying sign is that there might not be significant 
progress in the near future because of the concern that environmental protection might slow 
                                                 
75 "750,000 a year killed by Chinese pollution," Financial Times, July 2, 2007.  350,000 to 400,000 died prematurely 
from air pollution in Chinese cities, 300,000 from poor air indoors, and 60,000 (mostly in countryside) from poor-quality 
water.  
76 "OECD highlights Chinese pollution," Financial Times, July 17, 2007.  
77 Quoted in James Kynge, "Modern China is facing an ecological crisis," Financial Times, July 26, 2004. 
78 "China fails to hit target for saving energy," Financial Times, January 11, 2007.  
79  "Report on mainland's No. 1 emissions status 'flawed'," South China Morning Post, June 21, 2007.  Chinese 
officials have questioned the credibility of the report's conclusion "that the mainland's carbon dioxide emissions, which 




growth down too much.  This concern might be the reason for the recent suspension of the 
release of green GDP estimates





Conclusion   
 
In appraising whether the attainment of the October 2006 vision of a Harmonious Society 
would be sufficient to sustain high economic growth in China, the greatest inadequacy I see is 
the absence of an objective to build a harmonious world.  A harmonious society cannot endure 
in China unless there is also a harmonious world, and vice-versa.  China's pursuit of a 
harmonious society requires it to actively help provide the global public goods that makes a 
harmonious world possible; and the two global public goods that come readily to mind are the 
strengthening of the multilateral free trade system, and the protection of the global 
environmental commons. 
 
China has benefited immensely from the GATT-WTO free-trade regime, and yet it has, 
up to this point, played a very passive role in pushing the Doha Round negotiations forward to 
completion.  By default, Brazil and India have assumed the leadership of the developing 
economies camp in the trade negotiations.  According to Susan Schwab, the U.S. Trade 
Representative, at the G4 (US, EU, Brazil and India) meeting in Potsdam in June 2007, Brazil 
and India retreated from their earlier offers to reduce their manufacturing tariffs in return for cuts 
in agricultural subsides by the developed economies because of "their fear of growing Chinese 
imports."
82   The Brazilian-Indian action caused the Potsdam talks to fail and hurt the many 
developing economies that were agricultural exporters.   
 
China should now seek a leadership role in the Doha Round negotiations that is 
commensurate with its participation in international trade.  Failure of the Doha Round could set 
in motion the unraveling of multilateral free trade because the present international atmosphere 
is right for protectionism.  The US, which has traditionally been at the forefront for expanding the 
multilateral free trade system, is now beset by self-doubt for three major reasons.   
                                                 
80 "China's Bid to Gauge Cost of Pollution Is Set Back," The Wall Street Journal, July 17, 2007; and "Faith in green 
GDP idea lost amid the bickering," South China Morning Post, July 24, 2007. 





First, the US was willing to put up with the pains of structural adjustments in the 1960-
1990 period to accommodate the growing imports from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and 
ASEAN because they were frontline allies in the Cold War.  With the end of the Cold War, it is 
natural for the US to re-consider the economic cost of structural adjustment because the security 
and ideological benefits from it have gone down. 
 
Second, the amount of required structural adjustment in the US to accommodate the rise 
of the SIC bloc is far greater than the earlier adjustment to the rise of its Cold War allies.  As 
noted, the entry of the former Soviet, Indian and Chinese economies has doubled the labor force 
participating in the international division of labor.   
 
Third, the strongest lobby for free trade in the US has been the economics profession, 
and the free trade doctrine has come under strong internal criticism in the last few years.  Paul 
Samuelson has made many fundamental contributions to the development of the standard trade 
models that convinced mainstream economists that free trade is the best policy, and it was 
therefore an intellectual earthquake when he argued in 2004 that under free trade, where 
outsourcing accelerates the transfer of knowledge to the developing country, there could be a 
decline in the welfare of the developed country.
83  Intellectual apostasy is spreading; for example, 
in 2005, Alan Blinder joined Paul Samuelson in criticizing free trade fundamentalism.   
 
In terms of policy recommendations, Samuelson and Blinder are pushing for temporary, 
not permanent, retreat from free trade.  They want to slow down the adjustment process for a 
decent interval to produce a less painful transition for US workers.  For Samuelson, "You need 
more temporary protection for the losers.  My belief is that every good cause is worth some 
inefficiency."
84  For Blinder, he wants the temporary protection to allow the US to revamp its 
education system to prepare "workers for jobs that can't easily go overseas' and to revamp its 
tax system to "reward companies that produce jobs that stay in the US."
85  While it is not yet 
clear about the veracity of the Samuelson-Blinder hypothesis, it is clear, however, that the 
hypothesis reflects the widespread pains of structural adjustment that they witness around them 
-- a phenomenon captured by the decreasing length of median job tenure.  
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83 See Samuelson (2004); and "Shaking Up Trade Theory," Business Week, December 6, 2004..  





In April 2007, the US bypassed multilateralism in free trade by agreeing to form a Free 
Trade Area (FTA) with South Korea.  With the US weakening in its resolve to protect the 
multilateral free trade system, China should now become more active in the Doha Round 
negotiations to deregulate world trade further.  Such a role will be very much in China's interest 
because Brazil is now bypassing multilateral trade liberalisation by entering into FTA 
negotiations with the European Union.  The fact is that a growing number of nations like Brazil 
"are increasingly wary of a multilateral deal because it would mandate tariff cuts, exposing them 
more deeply to low-cost competition from China. Instead, they are seeking bilateral deals with 
rich countries that are tailored to the two parties' needs."
86  It is the time for China to show that it 
is a responsible stakeholder by joining in the stewardship of the multilateral free trade system. 
 
The global environment is the second area where China can help to build a harmonious 
system.  Specifically, China should be mobilising international consensus to form an 
international research consortium to develop ways to burn coal cleanly because China is now 
building a power station a week and is hence able to facilitate extensive experimentation on 
prototype plants to burn coal cleanly.  If successful, this global cooperation on clean energy 
research will unleash sustainable development in China as well as in the rest of the world. 
 
We realize of course that while the need to maintain high growth could motivate China to 
become more active in supplying global public goods, it might not be allowed to do so however 
because of the usual reluctance of the existing dominant powers to share the commanding 
heights of the world political leadership.  The sad experience of Japan being denied permanent 
membership of the Security Council of the United Nations is a case in point.  Harmonious 
international relations are the omitted item in China’s perception of a Harmonious Society in 
2006, and it could turn out to be a very soft spot in the Chinese growth engine.  
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Table 1: The Future Distribution of Economic Power:
GDP in trillions of US$, in 2005 prices
G-7 = USA, Japan, Germany, France, UK, Italy and Canada
BRIC = Brazil, Russia, India and China
G-7 BRIC USA China India
2005 27.3 4.2 12.5 1.9 0.7
2025 39.3 20.4 19.6 11.7 3.6
2040 52.3 52.3 29.2 29.4 12.9
2050 64.0 90.0 37.7 48.6 27.2





Table 2: The Headcount Measure of the Incidence of poverty in rural China, 1990-2002
* Headcount measure, number of rural poor/rural population (in percent)
* Poverty line is in 1985 PPP US$ per day
Poverty
Line $0.50 $0.71 $0.75 $1.00 $1.25 $1.50 $1.75 $2.00
1990 3.78 13.72 15.76 31.25 47.74 62.28 73.29 80.96
1991 5.00 14.96 17.08 31.70 47.49 61.69 72.64 80.37
1992 3.83 12.96 15.00 30.13 44.56 58.58 69.76 77.91
1993 4.58 12.83 14.70 29.10 43.81 56.85 67.47 75.68
1994 4.50 11.81 13.43 25.90 37.46 50.46 62.10 71.46
1995 3.63 9.97 11.36 21.80 33.13 44.70 55.46 64.68
1996 1.82 5.59 6.55 15.04 25.36 36.02 46.14 55.32
1997 2.11 5.44 6.26 13.49 22.59 32.32 41.87 50.82
1998 1.87 4.55 5.20 11.45 19.96 29.51 39.14 48.28
1999 1.68 4.30 4.93 11.05 19.29 28.46 37.70 46.49
2000 2.79 5.65 6.29 12.10 19.77 28.41 37.26 45.79
2001 3.05 5.65 6.21 11.38 18.38 26.53 35.11 43.55
2002 2.87 5.38 5.92 10.90 17.60 25.39 33.59 42.19
2003 3.03 5.30 5.78 10.19 16.26 23.53 31.41 39.35
2004 2.20 3.94 4.32 7.90 13.11 19.63 26.93 34.50
2005 2.81 4.24 4.54 7.21 11.08 16.20 22.38 29.27
The 1990-97 figures are from World Bank (2001) Annex 1 Table 3, and the post-1997 figures are computed by
Ximing Yue (private communication).  
 Table 3: Comparative Inequality in Income Distribution
Income Ratio of
Gini Coefficients  Top 20%/Bottom 20% 
Period  Initial Year  Final Year Initial Year  Final Year
1. Asian Member of Asian Development Bank
Nepal 1995–2003  37.65 47.30 6.19 9.47
China 1993–2004 40.74 47.25 7.57 11.37
Philippines 1994–2003  42.89 43.97 8.34 9.11
Turkmenistan 1998–2003  41.08 43.02 7.88 8.33
Thailand 1992–2002  46.22 41.96 9.41 7.72
Malaysia 1993–2004  41.22 40.33 7.72 7.70
Sri Lanka  1995–2002  34.36 40.18 5.34 6.83
Cambodia 1993–2004  31.80 38.05 5.24 7.04
Viet Nam  1993–2004  34.91 37.08 5.40 6.24
Azerbaijan 1995–2001  34.96 36.50 6.09 5.96
India 1993–2004  32.89 36.22 4.85 5.52
Lao PDR  1992–2002  30.40 34.68 4.27 5.40
Indonesia 1993–2002  34.37 34.30 5.20 5.13
Bangladesh 1991–2005  28.27 34.08 4.06 5.03
Kazakhstan 1996–2003  35.32 33.85 6.20 5.61
Taipei,China 1993–2003  31.32 33.85 5.41 6.05
Armenia 1998–2003  36.01 33.80 5.87 5.08
Mongolia 1995–2002  33.20 32.84 5.53 5.44
Tajikistan 1999–2003  31.52 32.63 4.97 5.14
South Korea 1993–2004  28.68 31.55 4.38 5.47
Pakistan 1992–2004  30.31 31.18 4.22 4.46
Japan 1993 24.90 3.37
2. Latin America
Colombia 2003 58.60 25.30
Paraguay 2002 57.80 27.80
Panama 1997 57.19 28.86
Brazil 2004 56.99 23.00
Chile 1998 55.77 16.72
Peru 2002 54.60 18.60
Ecuador 1998 53.53 18.70
Mexico 1998 53.11 16.90
Argentina (Urban) 2003 51.28 18.40
El Salvador  1997 50.79 15.20
Costa Rica 2001 49.90 14.20






Table 3: Comparative Inequality in Income Distribution (continued)
Income Ratio of
Gini Coefficients  Top 20%/Bottom 20% 
Period  Initial Year  Final Year Initial Year  Final Year
3. Sub-Saharan Africa
South Africa  2000 57.77 20.50
Cote d'Ivoire 2002 44.60 9.70
Nigeria 2003 43.60 9.80
Kenya 1997 42.50 8.20
Burundi 1998 42.40 9.50
Zambia 2002-3 42.10 8.00
Senegal 1995 41.30 7.50
Ghana 1998 40.75 8.40
Burkina Faso 2003 39.50 6.90
Benin 2003 36.50 6.00
Tanzania 2000 34.60 5.80
Ethiopia   1999-2000 30.00 4.30
4. Other Countries
United States  2000 39.42 8.45
United Kingdom  2002 34.37 5.59
Spain 1998 34.00 5.86
Italy 2002 33.30 5.80
Canada 2000 32.45 5.48
Australia 2002 30.90 ... 
Norway 2002 29.60 4.64
France 2001 27.00 4.11
Finland 2003 25.80 3.58
Sweden 2002 25.80 3.58
Germany 2001 25.00 3.50
New Zealand 1997 23.65 ....
Sources: Asian Development Bank (2007), and United Nations (2006)  
 